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Bonnie Wilson 
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Dr. Greg Beabout is Professor of Philosophy at Saint Louis University (SLU), whose work focuses on virtue ethics. Dr. 
Bonnie Wilson is Associate Professor of Economics at SLU, who does work in the field of public choice.  
Beabout and Wilson’s article focuses on the peaceful nature of the resolution of Occupy SLU, a remarkable outcome given 
the extraordinary tension associated with the occupation’s context and circumstances. They use the insights of the 
disciplines of virtue ethics and economics to explain how a situation rife with potential conflict was transformed into a 
peaceful exchange.  
Abstract 
The events of Occupy SLU provide an example of how a situation rife with potential conflict can be 
transformed into a peaceful resolution. In this paper, we draw from the disciplines of economics and 
moral philosophy to shed light on certain features of the case of the Clock Tower Accords. Viewing 
the events of Occupy SLU from the perspective of these disciplines brings into focus several themes 
and important distinctions: the difference between a command-and-control-relationship compared with 
an exchange relationship; the difference between treating a situation in instrumental terms as a problem 
suited to a “technological” solution compared with seeing people and contexts from an 
“entrepreneurial” approach where hidden possibilities await realization; and recognizing the importance 
of exercising and cultivating good dispositions as crucial for leading well through a period of crisis. 
Bringing the perspectives of economics and ethics together to consider this case serves as a reminder of 
important connections between the exchange perspective of economics and the virtue ethics tradition 
of moral philosophy.  
I. Introduction
In the middle of the night on October 13, 2014, 
an unexpected scene unfolded at Saint Louis 
University (SLU). More than a thousand 
protestors streamed onto the campus and settled 
in around SLU’s iconic Clock Tower. A short 
while later, protestors issued a call over social 
media – tents and supplies were needed. So began 
the week-long “occupation” of Saint Louis 
University, now known by its hashtag: 
OccupySLU.  
The men and women who occupied SLU weren’t 
protesting any action by the university. They were 
protesting the social injustice of 
marginalized and brutalized black human 
beings and communities at the hands of the 
state, an injustice made all the more salient 
and raw given the recent deaths of three 
local, young black men, Michael Brown, 
Kajieme Powell, and VonDerrit Myers, Jr., 
all killed by white police officers. Amidst a 
confluence of events and geographical 
circumstances, SLU, a Jesuit institution with 
a social justice mission, emerged as a natural 
space for protestors to raise their voices and 
concerns. While many affiliated with the 
SLU community were supportive of 
Occupy SLU, others were not. Some 
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trustees, donors, alumni, parents of students, 
members of the executive staff, and students alike 
called for swift action to remove the protestors, by 
force if necessary. The week-long occupation was 
tense and chaotic – for the protestors, for 
students, for faculty, staff, and administrators. (A 
more detailed account of this case in its fuller context is 
available here.) 
 
In recent years, U.S. college campuses have roiled 
with protest. Arguably though, Occupy SLU was a 
singular event in the extent of its tension and in 
the manner of its resolution. In this paper, our 
primary focus is the manner of the resolution of 
Occupy SLU. The tense context in which that 
resolution took place, though, is important. Just 
two months prior to the occupation of SLU, 
Michael Brown, a young black man, was killed by 
a white police officer in the nearby St. Louis 
suburb of Ferguson. Historical racial tensions and 
distrust between the largely white police force and 
the majority black community in the area 
exploded into weeks of protest and civil unrest. 
SLU students (and faculty and staff) were among 
those out on the streets of Ferguson, protesting – 
and getting tear gassed and shot at with rubber 
bullets and wooden baton rounds by police. The 
Ferguson protests and the aggressive reaction of 
police to them fueled the Black Lives Matter 
(BLM) movement. That movement in turn 
produced a backlash. Conservative commentators 
called for the BLM movement to be named a hate 
group. Police groups accused protestors and the 
BLM movement of inciting a “war on cops.”  
 
In the midst of all this tension, two further events 
produced the critical juncture that culminated in 
Occupy SLU. Four days before the occupation of 
SLU, another young black man, VonDerrit Myers 
Jr., was shot and killed by another white police 
officer, two miles from the main SLU campus. 
Coincidentally, the very next day was the 
beginning of a nationally-promoted “weekend of 
resistance” in St. Louis. Visitors poured into the 
metropolitan area, among them celebrities such as 
Cornel West and Jesse Williams. Amidst the 
confluence of these events, protestors — 
toughened, emboldened, wisened by their 
experiences and encounters on the streets of 
Ferguson — occupied SLU, a social justice-
conscious institution, but also arguably a 
conservative “bubble” of evident white privilege. 
Occupy SLU was thus a situation uniquely rife 
with potential conflict. Extraordinarily however, 
over the course of a week, the potential conflict 
was transformed and a peaceful resolution 
emerged. The occupation began in the wee hours 
of a Monday morning. By Friday, protestors and 
the administration had cooperatively engaged one 
another and come to a mutually beneficial 
agreement that ended the occupation, an 
agreement now known as the Clock Tower 
Accords. How was a situation rife with potential 
conflict transformed into a peaceful resolution? 
We suggest that the disciplines of economics and 
moral philosophy shed important light on this 
question.  
 
Economics and moral philosophy connect and 
intertwine in important ways, especially through 
the virtue ethics tradition. This relationship may 
not, however, be immediately obvious. 
Contemporary neo-classically trained economists 
are often disciplinary and technical specialists, 
adept in the application of mathematical, 
computational, and quantitative methods. It is 
more common than not that contemporary 
economists dismiss ethics, either as self-serving 
and therefore fully captured by the homo economicus 
construction,2 or as a second-order concern (safely 
left to moral philosophers) relative to the 
instrumental value of extensive market activity. 
Philosophers are sometimes dismissive of 
economics as the dismal science, or as too focused 
on narrow financial concerns. Historically though, 
economists were moral philosophers, deeply 
concerned with ethical matters. Adam Smith 
himself held the chair of moral philosophy at the 
University of Glasgow. 3 Although Adam Smith is 
typically identified as the father of economics, 
another moral philosopher may more rightfully 
claim the title, namely, Aristotle.4 In one view, the 
discipline of economics has moved on from 
Aristotle and Smith and matters of ethics. In 
another view, evident in recent scholarship, the 
discipline has begun to rediscover the virtue ethics 
of Aristotle and Smith. For example, it is 
increasingly understood that Smith’s Theory of 
Moral Sentiments not only characterizes morality as 
an emergent order just as his Wealth of Nations 
characterizes markets as an emergent order,5 but 
also that our moral sentiments imply that the 
market is both a moral space and a moral teacher.6 
Becker7 argues that the concept of rationality, 
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especially as treated by Aristotle, has the potential 
to tie virtue ethics to economic thought, and in so 
doing to help us meet head on the rerum novarum 
of our age. More general examples of this 
rediscovery include Bruni and Sugden,8 who 
recently wrote in the Journal of Economic Perspectives 
about “Reclaiming Virtue Ethics for Economics,” 
and Baker and White9 who have assembled an 
edited volume on Economics and the Virtues: Building 
a New Moral Foundation. 
 
In the particular context of Occupy SLU, the 
disciplines of economics and moral philosophy 
connect and intertwine through the virtue ethics 
tradition most clearly with respect to the theme of 
“relationship.” More specifically, we suggest that a 
posture of cooperation, a characteristic of 
economic acts of exchange (à la Adam Smith), was 
adopted, rather than a posture of coercion. We 
further suggest that this may have been facilitated 
by an awareness of the ends towards which 
human beings should be oriented, along with 
practicing the virtues integral to human flourishing 
together in a community. Ultimately, the posture 
of cooperation avoided a series of formulaic 
dictates and instead facilitated a situational and 
contextual approach. As a result, an 
interdependent community of stakeholders was 
recognized, facilitating the transformation of a 
situation rife with potential conflict into a peaceful 
resolution. 
 
The story of Occupy SLU is a complicated one, 
with a large cast of characters: administrators, 
staff, faculty, students, trustees, alumni, activists 
and protestors. Depending on one’s perspective, 
all of those groups of individuals, or only a subset 
of them, might be considered stakeholders vis-à-vis 
the events of Occupy SLU, not to mention the 
Jesuits and members of the local St. Louis 
community, among others. It is beyond our scope 
to treat fully all involved with and affected by the 
events of Occupy SLU. Our treatment focuses 
primarily on administrators and on Dr. Fred 
Pestello, as president of SLU, in particular, and to 
some extent on the protestors and activists. In so 
doing, we seek to highlight what seem to us key 
choices that facilitated a peaceful resolution; we 
do not mean to suggest that no others played 
important roles in this case. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. In sections II and III, we focus on the 
economic perspective. We first explore how 
leadership through exchange relationship rather 
than command-and-control management played 
an important role in the transformation of Occupy 
SLU. We then suggest that an entrepreneurial 
approach to problem solving rather than a 
technological approach also contributed. In 
section IV, we explain how the tradition of virtue 
ethics also provides insight and suggests that the 
practice of virtue by administrators and protestors 
alike facilitated the transformation. In section V, 
we address the role of SLU’s mission and Jesuit 
tradition. We offer concluding remarks in section 
VI. 
 
II. Exchange versus Command-and-Control 
 
In order to understand how an economic 
perspective informs vis-à-vis the events of Occupy 
SLU, it is helpful to be aware of two distinct ways 
that the discipline is defined. Inspired by Lord 
Robbins,10 textbooks have long defined 
economics as the study of the allocation of scarce 
resources among competing ends. On this 
account, and in the tradition of modern 
neoclassical welfare economics, the economic 
problem is a simple matter of mathematical 
optimization. In his 1964 presidential address to 
the Southern Economic Association, Buchanan11 
suggested that economists should turn their 
attention away from this “theory of resource 
allocation,” and back towards the discipline’s 
historical roots and Adam Smith’s observation 
that human beings have an innate “propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for 
another.” He advocated for economics as the 
study of exchange, a perspective that understands 
economics as the study of the pervasive human 
activity of cooperation.  
 
It is through the lens of exchange and cooperation 
that the discipline of economics informs vis-à-vis 
Occupy SLU. There are, after all, two general ways 
SLU’s administration might have responded to the 
occupation of the campus by protestors: with a 
cooperative, exchange approach or with an 
adversarial, command-and-control approach. 
Exchange relationships are mutually beneficial, 
win-win activities. They take place between equals, 
in the sense that both parties to an exchange are 
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empowered as individuals to make their own 
choices as they freely cooperate. While exchange 
relationships are ubiquitous, and perhaps most 
evident in extensive market activity between 
buyers and sellers, command-and-control 
relationships govern many of the interactions that 
take place within organizations such as firms. 
Within firms, activity is coordinated not by prices, 
as in market exchange, but by executives and 
managers who operate as central planners. Within 
firms, individuals are often not empowered to 
make decisions themselves, but are obliged to 
abide the dictates of their managers. To be sure, 
cooperation of a sort is required, but the nature of 
the relationship between executives or managers 
and workers is that of superior to subordinate. It 
is thus often understood that it is the role of the 
executive and the manager to take command and 
to be in control, so as to ensure the efficient 
functioning of an organization. This 
administrative management school of thought is 
rooted in Henri Fayol’s age-old five management 
functions: planning, organizing, commanding, 
coordinating, and controlling. 12 While the 
increasing complexity of organizations in today’s 
dynamic and fast-changing environment has led to 
a movement away from organizational structures 
oriented to command-and-control, the functions 
of management found in college textbooks today 
are essentially those identified by Fayol.13 In the 
case of Occupy SLU, one might have thus 
expected SLU’s administration to respond with 
command-and-control actions, as it sought to 
fulfill its management function according to 
conventional understandings and ways of 
proceeding. 
 
Additional forces also may have militated in favor 
of a command-and-control, power-based 
approach to the occupation. SLU has a long 
history of hierarchical and bureaucratic 
management, and for many years was governed by 
a president with an old-style penchant for the 
tradition of command-and-control. He was known 
as micromanager and an aggressive CEO with a 
my-way-or-the-highway approach to decision-
making.14 SLU’s board of trustees likewise was 
seemingly populated by command-and-control-
style executives, who perhaps influenced, or at 
least reinforced, the former president’s style. For 
example, a long-time chairman of the board once 
made it clear that he understood the relationship 
between the administration and the faculty to be 
that of management versus labor. This confidant 
of the former president was also known for his 
channeling of the legendarily tough CEO Chuck 
Knight. A new president was inaugurated at SLU 
just ten days prior to the occupation of the 
campus. While the new president was, in part, 
brought in to change old ways of proceeding, he 
inherited an executive staff, a board of trustees, 
and institutional structures that had all been 
formed and built up in the context of a command-
and-control-style approach to management.  
 
When crisis and conflict came to SLU in the form 
of Occupy SLU, an impulse to respond with 
power-based command-and-control was evident. 
It was clear that some of the executive staff as well 
as some trustees understood that swift and 
decisive action was called for. It was also clear that 
Dr. Fred Pestello, SLU’s new president, felt 
pressure to quickly seize control, to exercise 
command, and to engineer a solution to the 
problem of Occupy SLU. After it became 
apparent that the campus was being occupied, 
Pestello called together his executive staff and 
several of the few black members of the SLU 
faculty. Once assembled, Pestello put the 
following question to the group: “What’s the 
quickest way to get rid of this problem?” The 
presence of protestors on campus, 
notwithstanding their social justice cause, was a 
“problem” that begged a solution, a solution that 
perhaps could be engineered — with proper 
planning, organizing, and coordinating — by the 
experts in the room and imposed, via top-down 
command-and-control. A number of stakeholders 
clearly understood that a particular command-and-
control-style solution to the problem was both 
appropriate and clear: forcibly remove the 
protestors. As one parent tweeted, “…do 
SOMETHING…It is a PRIVATE campus…We 
want our campus back…start acting.” Such views 
were commonly expressed publicly via social 
media and privately via phone calls to the 
university. In this view, the protestors had no 
standing, and their presence on the campus’ 
private property was not justified. Such a 
judgment further implied that the “problem” of 
protestors on campus was properly solved by the 
application of a simple moral rule: if someone 
occupies your private property, you are within 
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your rights to have them removed, and you should 
do so. 
 
Ultimately, Pestello chose not to pursue a rule-
based command-and-control-style response to the 
crisis confronting him. Instead, he chose to 
engage the protestors. Moreover, he did not 
engage them from the executive’s or manager’s 
typical position as a superior to subordinates. 
Instead, he chose to engage them as equals, 
through exchange relationship and the 
cooperation such an approach implies. Each day 
of the occupation, Pestello left his office, went 
down into the fray around the Clock Tower, and 
interacted with the protestors and community 
gathered there. After several days of such 
engagement, Pestello invited a small group of the 
protestors — two SLU students and two 
community activists — to a meeting. Strikingly, 
this meeting has been identified as one of the very 
first times in the history of the broader 
“Ferguson” movement (of which Occupy SLU 
was a part) that protestors on the ground were 
invited to engage in dialogue and cooperation by 
an individual in a position of authority. Previously 
the modus operandi of authorities had been 
command-and-control-style exertion of force. In 
response to the protests on the streets of 
Ferguson after Michael Brown’s death, authorities 
dispatched militarized police SWAT teams dressed 
in full-riot gear to confront the protestors. The 
result was violence and chaos. Protestors were tear 
gassed and shot with rubber bullets and wooden 
baton rounds. LRAD sound cannons were 
deployed and dogs brought in to incite fear and 
control crowds. A curfew was imposed, and the 
Missouri National Guard called in. Although these 
events served as a clear lesson for some that force 
in the face of protest can be counter-productive, 
Pestello’s cooperative approach and dialogue with 
the protestors that occupied SLU is nonetheless a 
striking contrast. 
 
Dr. Pestello’s attitudes and approaches during his 
interactions with protestors remained consistent 
with a cooperative rather than an adversarial 
approach throughout Occupy SLU. During the 
first formal meeting between Pestello and 
protestors, Pestello chose not to exert authority. 
He issued neither ultimatums nor orders. Instead, 
he asked questions and listened. He made 
suggestions and solicited reactions. The result was 
a mutually beneficial agreement — an exchange in 
which the protestors offered things of value to the 
university and in which the university offered 
things of value to the protestors — that also 
provided a basis for an end to the occupation.  
 
Exchange relationships can be fragile. 
Cooperation requires imagination, a sense of 
fairness, and trust if it is to be sustained. Not long 
after an agreement had been made, the protestors 
violated that agreement, primarily based on 
concerns that the university’s administration could 
not be trusted to abide the promises contained 
therein. The protestors reneged on a promise they 
made to end the occupation by 10:30 a.m. on 
Saturday morning. Instead of vacating the Clock 
Tower as promised, they asked to speak with 
Pestello face-to-face. Pestello would have been 
well within reasonable rights to refuse and simply 
require that the protestors abide their 
commitment and be on their way. Instead, he 
chose again to engage and walked from his office 
to the Clock Tower to speak with the protestors. 
Shortly thereafter, with sufficient trust restored, 
the protestors did abide their promise, and ended 
the occupation. 
 
In key regards, there is no denying that Dr. 
Pestello was in a position of authority relative to 
the protestors who occupied SLU’s campus. He 
chose though not to exert that authority and not 
to address the problem before him with 
command-and-control. Rather, he chose to adopt 
a position of relative equality, and to engage in a 
cooperative process of exchange with the 
protestors. In the absence of a counterfactual set 
of events, one cannot know if command-and-
control might have been more effective. It seems 
likely though that the exchange approach played a 
vital role in the transformation of a situation that 
was rife with potential conflict into a peaceful, 
cooperative, mutually beneficial end. 
 
Exchange relationship is by definition two-sided; 
in practice, such a relationship involves multiple 
parties freely entering into an agreement. While 
Dr. Pestello held formal authority, in an important 
regard, the protestors had a strategic advantage. 
Pestello had much to lose from an extended 
occupation, in large part because of the significant 
pressure he faced from stakeholders such as 
command-and-control-minded trustees, members 
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of his executive staff, and alumni, as well as 
concerned parents. He also had much to lose if a 
forced removal of protestors went badly. In that 
case, social-justice minded stakeholders would 
surely have cried out loudly. The protestors, in 
contrast, had little to lose. Interestingly, the 
protestors chose not to wield this strategic 
advantage and exert their own ability to 
command-and-control. They chose instead to 
reciprocate Pestello’s engagement and to 
cooperate. During the week-long occupation, the 
difficult topics of race and class and justice were 
discussed in both formal and informal 
conversations around the Clock Tower. It was not 
unusual in the midst of those conversations to 
hear young, black protestors coming to the 
defense of Pestello. In addition, it has been noted 
by Dr. Stefan Bradley, an historian and expert in 
black student movements, that the Clock Tower 
Accords — the agreement that ended the 
occupation — is par for the course in its content. 
One might have expected an agreement reached 
through cooperation to have offered more to the 
protestors, especially given their strategic 
advantage. It may be that in the chaos and tension 
of the week-long occupation, it was difficult for 
the protestors to organize and ask for more than 
they did. It seems likely though that their 
willingness to not push harder reflected what they 
understood to be honest and fair dealing from 
Pestello, honest and fair dealing that they chose to 
reciprocate. 
 
III. Entrepreneurship versus “Engineering” 
 
In his employment of an exchange-based 
approach to the crisis of Occupy SLU, Dr. 
Pestello departed from the more traditional 
command-and-control-style approach often 
deployed by executives and managers. There is a 
second way in which his handling of the crisis 
arguably differed from more conventional 
management styles. As Lucas’s15 work suggests, 
two broad categories of problems confront 
managers – “technological” problems and 
“entrepreneurial” problems. Conventional 
management styles often presume that problems 
are “technological” in nature. In describing an 
approach to social conflict as treating such cases 
as technological problems, we mean treating a 
social crisis situation as a problem to be 
approached with instrumental reasoning in which 
a technical solution can be engineered, based on 
given information, and in order to maximize some 
objective. Uncertainty may exist, but it can be 
measured and entails probabilistic risk. In such a 
mindset, ends are taken as given, and both the 
ends and various proposed means are taken as 
evident. In contrast, the approach adopted by 
Pestello in which he agreed to enter into an 
exchange relationship with the activists is more 
consistent with a conception of the problem of 
Occupy SLU as “entrepreneurial.” The 
entrepreneurial mindset views goals as emerging, 
contingent, subject to innovation, and capable of 
being refined, revised, deepened, and qualified. In 
the context of entrepreneurial problems, the 
operational environment, rather than existing in 
isolation, involves numerous actors who each 
have their own and possibly disparate plans, and 
who do not necessarily share ends. As such, the 
executive or manager has a limited ability to 
influence behavior and events. In addition, the 
information environment may be sparse rather 
than complete. The uncertainty faced is, à la 
Knight,16 immeasurable and cannot be calculated. 
In such a context, the extent to which solutions 
can simply be engineered is limited. Such 
problems require the application of 
entrepreneurial judgment. Executives and 
managers who perceive themselves as facing 
probabilistic risk are often tempted to engineer 
solutions to problems based on assessments of 
expected costs and benefits. If in reality the 
uncertainty being faced cannot be measured, an 
inappropriate pretense of knowledge may impede 
the use of judgment in the decision-making 
process. While solutions to technological 
problems can often be engineered or calculated 
and then imposed, entrepreneurial problems may 
require a more discovery-based approach and the 
application of judgment. 
 
Before addressing the particulars of how the 
administration’s approach to Occupy SLU reflects 
more of an entrepreneurial rather than a 
technological approach to problem-solving, a brief 
overview of the economic perspective’s theory of 
firms may be helpful. The notion that the 
problems faced by firm managers are 
technological has its roots in Coase’s17 theory of 
the firm. From an economic perspective, the 
existence of firms is, at first blush, a puzzle, since 
economic theory (and much evidence) teaches us 
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that decentralized decision-making by individuals 
works. As individuals go about their lives and 
engage one another in exchange, markets and 
prices emerge. Those prices so effectively 
aggregate information and coordinate behavior 
that millions of strangers can cooperate with one 
another. It is this cooperation on a massive scale 
that is understood to have produced the 
extraordinary rise in prosperity observed in parts 
of the world in roughly the last 200 years. If 
decentralized decision-making in the context of 
markets is so great, the puzzle then is, why do we 
have firms? Firms, after all, are organizations 
within which decision-making is centralized and 
managers coordinate activity via command-and-
control. Coase suggested that transactions costs 
explain firms — the transactions costs associated 
with the bargaining, the wheeling and dealing, the 
relationship, required of exchange. Simply put, in 
complex, dynamic contexts, exchange has clear 
information advantages over command-and-
control. In sufficiently simple, static contexts, 
however, the ease of command-and-control can 
dominate the relational work of exchange, leading 
to the existence of firms. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
as firms and similar organizations have grown in 
size and complexity, an alternative theory of the 
firm has developed, known as the entrepreneurial 
theory of the firm.18 In this view, firm 
management is not a simple technological matter 
of optimization. Rather, firm management takes 
place in a context of uncertainty that requires the 
deployment of entrepreneurial judgment. 
  
The situation of Occupy SLU is arguably 
characterized by features of an entrepreneurial 
rather than a technological problem. The actors 
involved did not fully share ends and had 
disparate plans. Dr. Pestello was committed to a 
quick end to the occupation. Some faculty favored 
an extended occupation. Pestello clearly shared 
sympathy with some of the goals of the 
protestors, as evidenced by remarks he offered in 
his inaugural address, just days before the 
occupation. He also though prioritized safety and 
preservation of fundamental operations during the 
occupation. Protestors’ priorities were clearly 
different, as education in part through the means 
of disruption was one of their goals. While some 
students shared protestors’ goals, others very 
clearly wanted nothing more than an end to 
disruption, so that they might better pursue their 
self-interest of maximizing academic performance 
— the occupation occurred during midterm week. 
Engineering and calculation approaches to 
problem solving in the context of an organization 
within which individuals pursue shared objectives 
may well be feasible. In the context of an 
environment populated by individuals pursuing 
disparate aims, such approaches seem likely to be 
much less effective.  
 
In addition, the events of Occupy SLU may well 
have been characterized more by Knightian 
uncertainty than by probabilistic risk. Nonetheless, 
Dr. Pestello and some of his executive staff were 
clearly tempted to engage in calculation of costs 
and benefits of various actions, as if the risk they 
faced was probabilistic. For example, before the 
occupation, Ferguson movement organizers made 
contact with Pestello and requested that the 
university host an interfaith event in conjunction 
with a nationally-advertised “weekend of 
resistance,” dubbed Ferguson October. Those 
against the proposal couched their opposition in 
terms of expected brand and image diminution as 
well as tuition dollar losses due to conditional 
expected enrollment declines. Those in favor of 
the proposal tended to take a more judgment-
based approach, couching their support in terms 
of the kind of institution SLU should be and in 
terms of duty to hospitality and neighbor, rather 
than in terms of calculable costs and benefits. 
Ultimately, the latter arguments turned out to be 
more compelling from Pestello’s perspective, as he 
decided that the event would take place on SLU’s 
campus.  
 
Once the occupation was in full swing, discussions 
about how to proceed continued to reflect some 
presumption of probabilistic rather than 
indeterminate risk. Threats such as student 
withdrawals, reduced campus visits by prospective 
students, decreased applications, and fundraising 
challenges were all considered. Provision of a safe 
and traditional environment was cited as an 
expected benefit of a swift removal of the 
protestors. The possibility that SLU students 
would be arrested during an effort to forcibly 
remove protestors was noted. Throughout the 
crisis, Dr. Pestello maintained a commitment to a 
quick end to the occupation and prioritized safety 
and preservation of fundamental operations. 
Seemingly though, he did not base decision-
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making as to the means by which that 
commitment and those priorities would be 
fulfilled on an optimization strategy that weighed 
expected costs and benefits. Rather, he exercised 
judgment.  
 
Dr. Pestello’s choice to approach the problem of 
Occupy SLU via relationship and exchange was 
more entrepreneurial than technological. His 
decisions arguably were more reflective of the 
exercise of judgment than of the engineering and 
calculation of a technical solution. Again, in the 
absence of a counterfactual set of events, one 
cannot know if the alternative of a more 
technological rather than an entrepreneurial 
approach might have been more effective. It 
seems likely though that his approach was a wise 
one given the complex and dynamic nature of the 
problem he faced.  
 
IV. Virtue Ethics 
 
In order to understand how insights from 
contemporary moral philosophy might add to 
understanding decisions made in the case of 
Occupy SLU to engage in exchange and adopt an 
entrepreneurial approach, it helps to begin with a 
review of several features of contemporary virtue 
ethics. In contemporary academic moral 
philosophy, virtue ethics has emerged as one of 
three major approaches to normative ethics. For 
much of the 20th century, especially in the English-
speaking world of academic philosophy, two 
approaches to ethics were prominent, and each 
focused on the morality of actions. One approach, 
deontology, emphasizes duties and universal 
human rights; another approach, utilitarianism, 
emphasizes the consequences of actions. 
According to these two approaches, the task of 
moral philosophy is to provide a rationally 
justified standard for right action; individual 
desires and goals are taken as given, and actions 
are subject to moral constraints so long as these 
can be justified.  
 
Contemporary virtue ethics emerged as a response 
to problems in the action-based frameworks of 
modern moral philosophy, and as a response to 
the apparently interminable debates between and 
within advocates of deontology and utilitarianism. 
Elizabeth Anscombe,19 in her landmark essay, 
“Modern Moral Philosophy,” argued that 
philosophers should abandon those frameworks, 
and instead retrieve insights from the earlier 
tradition of the virtues, especially from Aristotle. 
Anscombe’s20 proposal and the ensuing debates 
have generated a vast literature, including 
contemporary reformulations of virtue ethics, a 
renewed interest in ancient traditions that 
emphasize practicing the virtues, feminist 
contributions that have shifted the debates in 
moral philosophy away from focusing on discreet 
actions in light of detached standards such as duty 
and utility to consider the importance of 
cultivating desirable dispositions, attending to care 
and relationships, and renewing emphasis on 
questions of character, context, narrative, 
tradition, and increased awareness of the 
importance of setting, perspective, shaping 
desires, and cultivating traits integral to 
responsible agency, healthy relationships, and 
human flourishing. Thus, in contrast with 
tendencies in utilitarianism and deontology to treat 
human actions as discreet, isolated fragments, 
virtue ethics involves not only a renewed emphasis 
on character and community, but also a different 
sort of epistemology, one which implies continuity 
over time and attentiveness to developmental 
characteristics of human knowing along with the 
dispositions and situated character of human 
existence in concrete historical contexts and 
communities. Accordingly, there is a sense in 
which contemporary virtue ethics re-cast the 
concerns of moral philosophy as a sort of post-
modern response to the frameworks of modern 
moral philosophy, though there is another sense in 
which virtue ethics has involved a retrieval of pre-
modern concerns with developing those qualities 
of character and intellect that make for a good 
human life. In any case, contemporary virtue 
ethics has taken its place within the discussion of 
contemporary moral philosophy as a distinctive 
and prominent mode of moral reasoning. 
 
As noted in section two above, in order for 
cooperation in exchange relations to be sustained, 
several dispositions are required: a creative 
imagination that sees hidden possibilities, a sense 
of fairness, and the judgment and confidence 
requisite to enter and sustain trust. Virtue ethics, 
with its distinctive grammar, provides a highly 
developed account of such dispositions. A virtue 
is a cultivated disposition, that is, an acquired 
human quality that persists across time in various 
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contexts. The virtues allow one to take up the 
quest with others in pursuit of worthwhile goods. 
The pursuit of worthwhile goods includes 
acknowledging that it is helpful to interact with 
others in shared deliberation and debate about 
which goods are worth pursuing in the context of 
a particular setting. The virtues are acquired first 
by imitating those more excellent than oneself; 
deliberately repeating and perfecting the good 
actions of an exemplary model confirms and 
consolidates desirable dispositions. Accordingly, 
desires are shaped by one’s actions, and awareness 
of this makes it possible, to some extent, for one 
to educate one’s desires, especially by deliberately 
taking up the role of an apprentice on the journey 
toward mastery of a worthwhile social practice. 
The virtues hinge on four central excellences that 
perfect powers of life integral to each human 
person and well-formed community. Courage 
brings order and excellence to the urge to fight or 
flee. Moderation tempers and completes the 
appetites, especially for food and physical touch. 
Justice is ordered balance within oneself and in 
relation to others. Practical wisdom or prudence is 
excellence in thought guiding action, allowing one 
to approach the truth regarding the best course of 
action by discerning a situation in its full 
complexity, recognizing multiple perspectives. All 
the other virtues hinge on these four cardinal 
excellences; the greater theological virtues (faith, 
hope, and love) flower from these, and countless 
lesser virtues are corollaries. Thus, patience takes 
courage, gentleness requires moderating feelings 
of anger, and gratitude flows from justice to 
recognize and respond to gifts granted, and so 
forth. Practicing the virtues in difficult situations 
requires approaching complicated social conflicts 
with a creative imagination, good judgment, 
confidence, hope, and an ability to discern when it 
is appropriate to treat another person as 
trustworthy. 
 
The virtues are developed as one increasingly 
comes to understand oneself as a responsible 
agent who is a member of a community. 
Practicing the virtues involves understanding the 
narrative of one’s life and seeing oneself as a co-
author in the narrative of one’s life-journey. This 
includes cultivating one’s powers of memory and 
imagination with an awareness of both where one 
has come from and where one might be going. It 
also includes an awareness that one is a character 
in the life-journey of others; as such, one is a 
member various communities. The various 
communities of which one is a member, and the 
various traditions of those communities, are 
situated and limited in certain ways. Thus, 
practicing the virtues involves recognizing that 
one lives in a world composed of many 
communities and traditions. The virtues are 
integral both to the task of becoming a 
responsible member of the communities and 
traditions of which one is a part, and to the task of 
encountering other communities and traditions. 
Finally, because human existence is a gift we did 
not give to ourselves, and because any human who 
is a responsible agent has relied on the gifts of 
many others who made it possible to develop 
through periods of vulnerability and dependence, 
the virtues are required for participating in various 
relationships of giving and receiving, including 
relationships in which we voluntarily enter, and 
relationships in which we find ourselves as a result 
of circumstances not of our own making. 
 
With this brief background, we might consider 
how the vocabulary of virtue ethics helps us learn 
lessons about leadership from the case of Occupy 
SLU, and how the virtues play a role in exchange 
and in exercising judgment in the context of an 
entrepreneurial problem. First, it is worth noting 
that in the case of Occupy SLU, the cast of 
characters is complicated; many people played 
various kinds of leadership roles in this case. In an 
obvious way, Dr. Fred Pestello played an 
important leadership role in this case. He had to 
practice the virtues at several key decision points 
in this case: in his decision to practice hospitality 
to welcome an inter-faith program related to the 
protest movement on SLU’s campus, and in his 
decision to practice humility by seeking out the 
advice of African American faculty members 
throughout the occupation and calling in a 
consultant at the beginning of the occupation, and 
then to listen to the faculty’s and the consultant’s 
suggestion that he should not act from fear, but 
should instead make a mission-based decision. At 
the same time, many others practiced the virtues 
during the events in this case. Listing all of these, 
and considering the virtues practiced by each, 
would quickly become tedious, since many people 
played a role in the complex events of this case. 
Certainly not every action in this case was an 
exercise of the virtues, but many people did play 
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various sorts of leadership roles, and frequently 
those individuals did so while practicing the 
virtues. Despite tensions and difficulties, this case 
included many acts of hospitality, patience, self-
control, generosity, courage, persistence, civility, 
kindness, hopefulness, solidarity, caring, 
teamwork, creativity, foresight, and good 
judgment. Rather than seeking to assemble a list 
of those who practiced such virtues — the SLU 
administrators, faculty, staff, students, Jesuits, and 
others associated with the university, along with 
activists and others who played a role during this 
case — it seems more helpful to focus on one 
important chapter in the case: the decision of the 
administrators and the activists to engage one 
another in a relationship of trust ordered toward 
seeking an agreement to end the occupation.  
 
The decision to begin that process, and then work 
together toward a shared agreement, involved the 
exercise of the virtues. Both the leaders of SLU 
and the leaders of the activists practiced civility 
when they agreed to meet with one another to 
work toward a shared agreement. In doing so, a 
relationship that included obvious conflict was 
able to move forward by virtue of a shared 
willingness to treat potential combatants as human 
beings with dignity, self-direction, and intelligence, 
that is, as persons who have concerns. In doing 
so, those on both sides of the dispute were able to 
engage one another as human persons with whom 
one can enter into a relationship of mutual 
exchange.  
 
We acknowledge that some who are comfortable 
with the framework of virtue ethics might find it 
jarring to glide from a description of agents as 
“persons who have concerns” or as persons able 
to engage with others as people gifted with 
intelligence and freedom to a description of the 
relationship as occurring in a spirit of “mutual 
exchange.” Such a description might seem to 
some as oddly economic, and thus divorced from 
the domain of ethics. This sort of objector seems 
to presume that economics is a zero-sum game, 
and that economists are concerned solely with 
zero-sum contexts in which one person’s gain 
involves another person’s loss. In response to 
such an objector, several things might be noted. 
First, when we appeal to the spirit of mutual 
exchange that is the concern of economists, we 
have in mind positive-sum games in which each 
party exercises intelligence and freedom to enter 
into a mutually beneficial relationship. Further, 
while we acknowledge that mutually beneficial 
exchange can be conducted with attitudes and 
approaches that are not consistent with the 
complete exercise of virtue, we want to note that 
lack of virtue is not integral to exchange 
relationships, while the practice of the virtues in 
relationships of mutual exchange helps the 
relationship go more smoothly, as in the ordinary 
case of buyers and sellers. The one who objects 
that relationships of mutual exchange are merely 
economic and thus incompatible with “ethics” 
may have presumed a suppressed premise that we 
think is false: in particular, there is a notion found 
in Kant’s duty ethics that an action is moral only 
when it is difficult for an individual in that it 
strains the individual’s non-moral inclinations and 
is done from solely a sense of duty.21 In contrast, 
the tendency in virtue ethics, with its emphasis on 
the character of the agent, is to affirm the moral 
worth of actions done from virtuous dispositions 
such as honesty, generosity, and justice. 
Accordingly, actions in an exchange relationship 
may be morally praiseworthy, including when the 
participation in such an exchange promotes the 
self-actualization of the agents involved. Thus, 
drawing from the language of economics to 
describe the relationship between SLU’s 
administrators and the activists as an “exchange 
relationship” is not intended to reduce the 
relationship to a kind of “moral bartering” that is 
incompatible with practicing the virtues; to the 
contrary, we see the two disciplines as 
complementary in the way each brings into focus 
features of a complex relationship. 
 
Thus, recognizing that an exchange relationship 
may involve the practice of the virtues where the 
parties in the exchange each have something to 
contribute, we can ask whether certain virtues are 
most integral in such a relationship. Our answer is 
rather traditional: the virtues most crucial for such 
a relationship include justice and practical wisdom. 
Doing so requires an awareness of the needs and 
desires of others. An exchange relationship may 
not be motivated by a sense of moral duty or an 
allegiance to a set of impartial obligations or 
human rights binding upon all rational agents, nor 
need it be motivated by a calculation that the 
exchange will produce the greatest benefits for the 
greatest number; however, such a relationship 
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does seem to involve a willingness to treat the 
other party to the exchange as a self-directed 
practical-reasoner. 
We might puzzle about the following question: in 
a conflict situation, what motives does one have 
for viewing others as potential parties to an 
exchange relationship? More specifically, we might 
wonder about the specific individuals in this case: 
Why did Dr. Pestello seek to address the crisis 
through negotiated-exchange rather than through 
command-and-control? Why did he have patience 
on the last day of the occupation when it seemed 
that the negotiated agreement was falling apart? 
Why did the activists decide to trust Dr. Pestello, 
even as some among them were raising skeptical 
concerns? These sorts of questions seem to point 
to the important role that SLU’s mission and the 
Jesuit tradition played in the events of Occupy 
SLU. 
 
V. The Role of Mission and the Jesuit 
Tradition 
 
To reflect on the role played by SLU’s mission 
and the Jesuit tradition in the events of Occupy 
SLU, it is helpful to begin by noting the important 
relationship between the virtues and tradition. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, an important voice in 
retrieving the emphasis on the virtues, has argued 
that virtues are integrally connected to social 
practices and traditions: 
 
So when an institution — a university, 
say, or a farm, or a hospital — is the 
bearer of a tradition of practice or 
practices, its common life will be partly, 
but in a centrally important way, 
constituted by a continuous argument as 
to what a university is and ought to be or 
what good farming is or what good 
medicine is. Traditions, when vital, 
embody continuities of conflict.22  
 
On this view, a tradition always includes ongoing 
debate about what it means to be part of the 
tradition. Typically, this debate is instigated by two 
sources. On the one hand, young people who are 
at the point in their lives in which they are 
transitioning from childhood acceptance of one’s 
tradition to an adult embrace of one’s tradition go 
through a period of dialectical engagement with 
one’s tradition, calling into question apparent 
inconsistencies within one’s tradition. On the 
other hand, members of a tradition who 
encounter other traditions encounter challenges 
from the perspective of those in the other 
tradition. After all, it is common for members of 
any given tradition to recognize both benefits and 
inadequacies in alien traditions. Engaging a 
tradition other than one’s own involves making 
oneself and one’s tradition vulnerable to praise 
and criticism from the perspective of the other 
tradition. Any tradition that loses the ability to 
make itself vulnerable to the perspective of others 
and their challenges — from its own members 
who are young or from contrarian gadflies or 
from the perspective of other traditions — is 
“dying or dead.”23  
 
The events of Occupy SLU certainly involved 
challenges to SLU’s mission and to the Jesuit 
tradition. SLU’s mission is “the pursuit of truth 
for the greater glory of God and for the service of 
humanity.”24 Those who emphasized the last part 
of the mission, “the service of humanity,” tended 
to see the concerns of the activists as consonant 
with the social justice concerns of the Jesuits since 
the time of Pedro Arrupe, S.J., with his 
reformulation of the purpose of the society in 
terms of a faith that does justice. On the other 
hand, some alumni along with some who were 
part of the SLU community emphasized the 
importance of having a safe and beautiful campus 
as a place where members of the community can 
engage in “the pursuit of truth for the greater 
glory of God.” After all, it’s quite reasonable to 
expect that the university and its agents — 
especially the administrators and the trustees —
would be concerned first and foremost with the 
safety of the students, especially since the 
occupation began at the beginning of midterm 
week.  
 
Something led Dr. Pestello to discern that 
emphasizing the social justice aspect of the 
mission as more consonant with what SLU “is and 
ought to be.” That something may have been the 
Jesuit charism and emphasis on becoming 
“contemplatives in action.” Jesuit mission is 
service of faith and promotion of justice, in 
dialogue with diverse cultures and in collaboration 
with many women and men of good will. Jesuits, 
in other words, act, and they act on the ground, 
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for and with others — rather than from a place of 
isolation. The protestors were led to SLU by this 
charism. By choosing to engage in exchange, both 
the protestors and Pestello lived it out. 
 
One might also wonder what helped Dr. Pestello 
adopt a posture of humility in so many instances 
throughout the occupation, especially given our 
modern society’s expectation that executives and 
others in positions of authority be demonstrably 
in command. Again, Jesuit charism may have 
played a role. Daley25 points out that the “third 
degree of humility” arguably lies at the heart of 
Ignatian spirituality. The third degree of humility 
calls a Jesuit to “poverty with Christ poor, rather 
than riches, insults with Christ loaded with them, 
rather than honors.”26 Perhaps it also called both 
Pestello and the protestors to accept and work 
within the uncertainty they faced, rather than 
attempt to govern and control their environment 
and those around them. Perhaps it also helped 
both Pestello and some of the protestors bear 
some of the insults they were subjected to when 
they chose cooperation and rejected coercion, and 
when they chose reciprocity and rejected their 
own surplus maximization. A posture of humility 
may also have made it easier for Pestello to 
discern that the conditions for a technological 
solution to the problem that he faced simply did 
not exist, and that an entrepreneurial approach 
was needed. The truth can, after all, be 
complicated. 
 
Finally, we might raise the following question. 
Granting that SLU’s Jesuit mission played a role in 
helping Dr. Pestello, the protestors, and many 
others involved in this case, was the Jesuit mission 
a crucial or necessary condition for the outcome 
of this case? Suggesting that the Jesuit tradition 
and SLU’s mission did play a crucial role, as we 
have done, seems to imply some unreasonable 
conclusions. Does it suggest that such an outcome 
is possible only at a Jesuit school? This seems too 
strong, for there are other contexts that encourage 
engaging in exchange relationships, an 
entrepreneurial mindset, and practicing the virtues. 
Also, many students educated at Jesuit institutions 
will find themselves as members of organizations 
that do not have the same sort of mission to draw 
from in moments of crisis. The example of those 
involved in this case, and the way decisions were 
made, while certainly shaped by the particular 
context in which people involved in the case acted 
with awareness influenced by features of the Jesuit 
tradition and SLU’s mission, also seems to 
transcend the particularity of SLU with its 
distinctive mission to show it is possible to engage 
others in a relationship of exchange and work with 
others toward an innovative solution by practicing 
the virtues.  
  
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
The events of Occupy SLU were extraordinary in 
a number of regards, perhaps especially so for the 
way in which a situation rife with potential conflict 
was transformed into a peaceful, cooperative 
exchange. It is perhaps important to acknowledge 
that even while such a claim seems evident, our 
treatment has not attempted to situate the events 
of Occupy SLU within the larger framework of 
research on social movements or attempted a 
comparative analysis of Occupy SLU with other 
protests and means of resolution. We hope that 
other scholars will take up that project.  
 
It is difficult to know whether there might be 
generalizable lessons with respect to social conflict 
to be drawn from the events of Occupy SLU. In 
particular, it could be that the conditions under 
which social conflict can be transformed into 
exchange are specific and narrow. Coase,27 for 
example, taught that exchange can overcome the 
problem of externalities if property rights are clear 
and transactions costs are low. Are there such 
conditions under which exchange can overcome 
the problem of social conflict? In the case of 
Occupy SLU, a kind of transaction cost problem 
was overcome in the sense that the group of 
individuals that actually came together to 
construct the Clock Tower Accords was small, 
facilitating agreement. The transformation of 
social conflict into an exchange may well require 
that an identifiable, relatively small group of 
people can come together and engage. Another 
important condition was seemingly evident in the 
case of Occupy SLU. Namely, both “sides” 
recognized that the other had something to 
contribute. Clearly, Dr. Pestello, in his role as the 
president of SLU, had resources he could offer in 
various forms to the protestors. Pestello also 
seemingly recognized that the protestors had 
something to offer to SLU as well. A willingness 
to see the other side of a social conflict as having 
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something to offer may also be a condition 
required for the transformation of social conflict 
into exchange. A comparative analysis of Occupy 
SLU with other protests might be a fruitful 
exercise for identifying additional conditions. 
 
There are a number of other lessons one might 
draw from the case of Occupy SLU. For example, 
the events of Occupy SLU suggest that leaders 
facing problems in complex, dynamic contexts 
should consider the means of exchange 
relationship as an alternative to command-and-
control, and might find it helpful to be able to 
perceive the problems they face as entrepreneurial 
in nature, rather than technological. The events of 
Occupy SLU further suggest a vital role for the 
perspective of virtue ethics in leader formation. 
During the occupation, Dr. Pestello as well as 
protestors certainly faced any number of dilemma-
laden decision nodes. It seems evident though that 
the transformation of conflict into cooperation 
was driven far less by the application of moral 
principles and far more by the practice of virtues. 
Throughout the events of Occupy SLU, it seems 
evident that questions such as “What kind of 
person should I be?” “What kind of institution is 
SLU?” guided decision-making and action in 
helpful ways. 
 
Lastly, we note that the events of Occupy SLU 
highlight the important role of discernment in 
effective leadership. Certainly, an exchange 
approach to leadership will not always dominate a 
command-and-control approach. How is a leader 
to choose which approach to apply to which 
problems? Likewise, some of the problems leaders 
confront are technological in nature while others 
are entrepreneurial. How is a leader to decide 
which kind of problem is being faced? Some 
decisions may be best made through the 
application of a moral rule, while others may call 
for a virtue ethical approach. How is a leader to 
pick the best philosophical approach for the 
decision at hand? Another key Jesuit charism 
provides guidance: discernment. Ignatian 
discernment entails distinguishing between ends 
and means, choosing the means best suited to 
achieving the end, and detaching from anything 
not intrinsically valuable. In today’s complex, 
dynamic world, it may be that Jesuit education 
becomes most distinctive and formative when it 
reveals the complicated nature of decision-making 
and teaches the art and practice of discernment. 
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